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Abstract
We consider the problem of learning to play a repeated multi-agent game with an
unknown reward function. Single player online learning algorithms attain strong
regret bounds when provided with full information feedback, which unfortunately
is unavailable in many real-world scenarios. Bandit feedback alone, i.e., observing
outcomes only for the selected action, yields substantially worse performance. In
this paper, we consider a natural model where, besides a noisy measurement of
the obtained reward, the player can also observe the opponents’ actions. This
feedback model, together with a regularity assumption on the reward function,
allows us to exploit the correlations among different game outcomes by means of
Gaussian processes (GPs). We propose a novel confidence-bound based bandit
algorithm GP-MW, which utilizes the GP model for the reward function and runs
a multiplicative weight (MW) method. We obtain novel kernel-dependent regret
bounds that are comparable to the known bounds in the full information setting,
while substantially improving upon the existing bandit results. We experimentally
demonstrate the effectiveness of GP-MW in random matrix games, as well as real-
world problems of traffic routing and movie recommendation. In our experiments,
GP-MW consistently outperforms several baselines, while its performance is often
comparable to methods that have access to full information feedback.
1 Introduction
Many real-world problems, such as traffic routing [14], market prediction [10], and social network
dynamics [21], involve multiple learning agents that interact and compete with each other. Such
problems can be described as repeated games, in which the goal of every agent is to maximize her
cumulative reward. In most cases, the underlying game is unknown to the agents, and the only way to
learn about it is by repeatedly playing and observing the corresponding game outcomes.
The performance of an agent in a repeated game is often measured in terms of regret. For example,
in traffic routing, the regret of an agent quantifies the reduction in travel time had the agent known
the routes chosen by the other agents. No-regret algorithms for playing unknown repeated games
exist, and their performance depends on the information available at every round. In the case of
full information feedback, the agent observes the obtained reward, as well as the rewards of other
non-played actions. While these algorithms attain strong regret guarantees, such full information
feedback is often unrealistic in real-world applications. In traffic routing, for instance, agents only
observe the incurred travel times and cannot observe the travel times for the routes not chosen.
In this paper, we address this challenge by considering a more realistic feedback model, where at
every round of the game, the agent plays an action and observes the noisy reward outcome. In
addition to this bandit feedback, the agent also observes the actions played by other agents. Under
this feedback model and further regularity assumptions on the reward function, we present a novel
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HEDGE [11] EXP3 [3] GP-MW [this paper]
Feedback rewards for all actions obtained reward obtained reward + opponents’ actions
Regret O(√T logKi) O(√TKi logKi) O(√T logKi + γT√T )
Table 1: Finite action set regret bounds that depend on the available feedback observed by player i at
each time step. Time horizon is denoted with T , and Ki is the number of actions available to player i.
Kernel dependent quantity γT (Eq. (3)) captures the degrees of freedom in the reward function.
no-regret algorithm for playing unknown repeated games. The proposed algorithm alleviates the need
for full information feedback while still achieving comparable regret guarantees.
Related Work. In the full information setting, multiplicative-weights (MW) algorithms [17] such
as HEDGE [11] attain optimal O(√T logKi) regret, where Ki is the number of actions available to
agent i. In the case of convex action sets in Rdi , and convex and Lipschitz rewards, online convex
optimization algorithms attain optimal O(√T ) regret [25]. By only assuming Lipschitz rewards
and bounded action sets, O(√diT log T ) regret follows from [18], while in [13] the authors provide
efficient gradient-based algorithms with ‘local’ regret guarantees. Full information feedback requires
perfect knowledge of the game and is unrealistic in many applications. Our proposed algorithm
overcomes this limitation while achieving comparable regret bounds.
In the more challenging bandit setting, existing algorithms have a substantially worse dependence on
the size of the action set. For finite actions, EXP3 [3] and its variants ensure optimalO(√TKi logKi)
regret. In the case of convex action sets, and convex and Lipschitz rewards, bandit algorithms attain
O(poly(di)
√
T ) regret [6], while in the case of Lipschitz rewards O(T
di+1
di+2 log T ) regret can be
obtained [22]. In contrast, our algorithm works in the noisy bandit setting and requires the knowledge
of the actions played by other agents. This allows us to, under some regularity assumptions, obtain
substantially improved performance. In Table 1, we summarize the regret and feedback model of our
algorithm together with the existing no-regret algorithms.
The previously mentioned online algorithms reduce the unknown repeated game to a single agent
problem against an adversarial and adaptive environment that selects a different reward function at
every time step [7]. A fact not exploited by these algorithms is that in a repeated game, the rewards
obtained at different time steps are correlated through a static unknown reward function. In [24]
the authors use this fact to show that, if every agent uses a regularized no-regret algorithm, their
individual regret grows at a lower rate ofO(T 1/4), while the sum of their rewards grows only asO(1).
In contrast to [24], we focus on the single-player viewpoint, and we do not make any assumption on
opponents strategies1. Instead, we show that by observing opponents’ actions, the agent can exploit
the structure of the reward function to reduce her individual regret.
Contributions. We propose a novel no-regret bandit algorithm GP-MW for playing unknown
repeated games. GP-MW combines the ideas of the multiplicative weights update method [17], with
GP upper confidence bounds, a powerful tool used in GP bandit algorithms (e.g., [23, 5]). When a
finite number Ki of actions is available to player i, we provide a novel high-probability regret bound
O(√T logKi + γT
√
T ), that depends on a kernel-dependent quantity γT [23]. For common kernel
choices, this results in a sublinear regret bound, which grows only logarithmically in Ki. In the case
of infinite action subsets of Rdi and Lipschitz rewards, via a discretization argument, we obtain a
high-probability regret bound of O(√diT log(diT ) + γT√T ). We experimentally demonstrate that
GP-MW outperforms existing bandit baselines in random matrix games and traffic routing problems.
Moreover, we present an application of GP-MW to a novel robust Bayesian optimization setting in
which our algorithm performs favourably in comparison to other baselines.
2 Problem Formulation
We consider a repeated static game among N non-cooperative agents, or players. Each player i has
an action set Ai ⊆ Rdi and a reward function ri : A = A1 × · · · × AN → [0, 1]. We assume that
the reward function ri is unknown to player i. At every time t, players simultaneously choose actions
at = (a
1
t , . . . , a
N
t ) and player i obtains a reward r
i(ait, a
−i
t ), which depends on the played action a
i
t
1In fact, they are allowed to be adaptive and adversarial.
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and the actions a−it := (a
1
t , . . . , a
i−1
t , a
i+1
t , . . . , a
N
t ) of all the other players. The goal of player i is
to maximize the cumulative reward
∑T
t=1 r
i(ait, a
−i
t ). After T time steps, the regret of player i is
defined as
Ri(T ) = max
a∈Ai
T∑
t=1
ri(a, a−it )−
T∑
t=1
ri(ait, a
−i
t ) , (1)
i.e., the maximum gain the player could have achieved by playing the single best fixed action in case
the sequence of opponents’ actions {a−it }Tt=1 and the reward function were known in hindsight. An
algorithm is no-regret for player i if Ri(T )/T → 0 as T →∞ for any sequence {a−it }Tt=1.
First, we consider the case of a finite number of available actions Ki, i.e., |Ai| = Ki. To achieve
no-regret, the player should play mixed strategies [7], i.e., probability distributions wit ∈ [0, 1]Ki
over Ai. With full-information feedback, at every time t player i observes the vector of rewards
rt = [r
i(a, a−it )]a∈Ai ∈ RKi . With bandit feedback, only the reward ri(ait, a−it ) is observed by
the player. Existing full information and bandit algorithms [11, 3], reduce the repeated game to a
sequential decision making problem between player i and an adaptive environment that, at each time
t, selects a reward function rt : Ai → [0, 1]. In a repeated game, the reward that player i observes at
time t is a static fixed function of (ait, a
−i
t ), i.e., rt(a
i
t) = r
i(ait, a
−i
t ), and in many practical settings
similar game outcomes lead to similar rewards (see, e.g., the traffic routing application in Section 4.2).
In contrast to existing approaches, we exploit such correlations by considering the feedback and
reward function models described below.
Feedback model. We consider a noisy bandit feedback model where, at every time t, player i
observes a noisy measurement of the reward r˜it = r
i(ait, a
−i
t ) + 
i
t where 
i
t is σi-sub-Gaussian, i.e.,
E[exp(c it)] ≤ exp(c2σ2i /2) for all c ∈ R, with independence over time. The presence of noise is
typical in real-world applications, since perfect measurements are unrealistic, e.g., measured travel
times in traffic routing.
Besides the standard noisy bandit feedback, we assume player i also observes the played actions a−it
of all the other players. In some applications, the reward function ri depends only indirectly on a−it
through some aggregative function ψ(a−it ). For example, in traffic routing [14], ψ(a
−i
t ) represents
the total occupancy of the network’s edges, while in network games [15], it represents the strategies
of player i’s neighbours. In such cases, it is sufficient for the player to observe ψ(a−it ) instead of a
−i
t .
Regularity assumption on rewards. In this work, we assume the unknown reward function ri :
A → [0, 1] has a bounded norm in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) associated with a
positive semi-definite kernel function ki(·, ·), that satisfies ki(a,a′) ≤ 1 for all a,a′ ∈ A. The
RKHS norm ‖ri‖ki =
√〈ri, ri〉ki measures the smoothness of ri with respect to the kernel function
ki(·, ·), while the kernel encodes the similarity between two different outcomes of the game a,a′ ∈ A.
Typical kernel choices are polynomial, Squared Exponential, and Matérn:
kpoly(a,a
′) =
(
b+
a>a′
l
)n
, kSE(a,a
′) = exp
(
− s
2
2l2
)
,
kMate´rn(a,a
′) =
21−ν
Γ(ν)
(
s
√
2ν
l
)ν
Bν
(
s
√
2ν
l
)
,
where s = ‖a− a′‖2, Bν is the modified Bessel function, and l, n, ν > 0 are kernel hyperparameters
[20, Section 4]. This is a standard smoothness assumption used in kernelized bandits and Bayesian
optimization (e.g., [23, 9]). In our context it allows player i to use the observed history of play to
learn about ri and predict unseen game outcomes. Our results are not restricted to any specific kernel
function, and depending on the application at hand, various kernels can be used to model different
types of reward functions. Moreover, composite kernels (see e.g., [16]) can be used to encode the
differences in the structural dependence of ri on ai and a−i.
It is well known that Gaussian Process models can be used to learn functions with bounded RKHS
norm [23, 9]. A GP is a probability distribution over functions f(a) ∼ GP(µ(a), k(a,a′)), specified
by its mean and covariance functions µ(·) and k(·, ·), respectively. Given a history of measurements
{yj}tj=1 at points {aj}tj=1 with yj = f(aj) + j and j ∼ N (0, σ2), the posterior distribution under
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Algorithm 1 The GP-MW algorithm for player i
Input: Set of actions Ai, GP prior (µ0, σ0, ki), parameters {βt}t≥1, η
1: Initialize: wi1 =
1
Ki
(1, . . . , 1) ∈ RKi
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3: Sample action ait ∼ wit
4: Observe noisy reward r˜it and opponents’ actions a
−i
t :
r˜it = r
i(ait, a
−i
t ) + 
i
t
5: Compute optimistic reward estimates rˆt ∈ RKi :
[rˆt]a = min{1, UCBt(a, a−it )} for every a = 1, . . . ,Ki (5)
6: Update mixed strategy:
[wit+1]a =
[wit]a exp(−η (1− [rˆt]a))∑Ki
k=1[w
i
t]k exp(−η (1− [rˆt]k))
for every a = 1, . . . ,Ki (6)
7: Update µt, σt according to (2)-(3) by appending (at, r˜it) to the history of play.
8: end for
a GP(0, k(a,a′)) prior is also Gaussian, with mean and variance functions:
µt(a) = kt(a)
>(Kt + σ2It)−1yt (2)
σ2t (a) = k(a,a)− kt(a)>(Kt + σ2It)−1kt(a) , (3)
where kt(a) = [k(aj ,a)]tj=1, yt = [y1, . . . , yt]
>, and Kt = [k(aj ,aj′)]j,j′ is the kernel matrix.
At time t, an upper confidence bound on f can be obtained as:
UCBt(a) := µt−1(a) + βtσt−1(a) , (4)
where βt is a parameter that controls the width of the confidence bound and ensuresUCBt(a) ≥ f(a),
for all a ∈ A and t ≥ 1, with high probability [23]. We make this statement precise in Theorem 1.
Due to the above regularity assumptions and feedback model, player i can use the history of play
{(a1, r˜i1), . . . , (at−1, r˜it−1)} to compute an upper confidence bound UCBt(·) of the unknown reward
function ri by using (4). In the next section, we present our algorithm that makes use of UCBt(·) to
simulate full information feedback.
3 The GP-MW Algorithm
We now introduce GP-MW, a novel no-regret bandit algorithm, which can be used by a generic player
i (see Algorithm 1). GP-MW maintains a probability distribution (or mixed strategy) wit overAi and
updates it at every time step using a multiplicative-weight (MW) subroutine (see (6)) that requires
full information feedback. Since such feedback is not available, GP-MW builds (in (5)) an optimistic
estimate of the true reward of every action via the upper confidence bound UCBt of ri. Moreover,
since rewards are bounded in [0, 1], the algorithm makes use of min{1, UCBt(·)}. At every time
step t, GP-MW plays an action ait sampled from w
i
t, and uses the noisy reward observation r˜
i
t and
actions a−it played by other players to compute the updated upper confidence bound UCBt+1(·).
In Theorem 1, we present a high-probability regret bound for GP-MW while all the proofs of this
section can be found in the supplementary material. The obtained bound depends on the maximum
information gain, a kernel-dependent quantity defined as:
γt := max
a1,...,at
1
2
log det(It + σ
−2Kt) .
It quantifies the maximal reduction in uncertainty about ri after observing outcomes {aj}tj=1 and
the corresponding noisy rewards. The result of [23] shows that this quantity is sublinear in T , e.g.,
γT = O((log T )d+1) in the case of kSE , and γT = O
(
T
d2+d
2ν+d2+d log T
)
in the case of kMate´rn,
where d is the total dimension of the outcomes a ∈ A, i.e., d = ∑Ni=1 di.
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Theorem 1. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1) and assume it’s are σi-sub-Gaussian with independence over time. For
any ri such that ‖ri‖ki ≤ B, if player i plays actions from Ai, |Ai| = Ki, according to GP-MW
with βt = B +
√
2(γt−1 + log(2/δ)) and η =
√
(8 logKi)/T , then with probability at least 1− δ,
Ri(T ) = O
(√
T logKi +
√
T log(2/δ) +B
√
TγT +
√
TγT (γT + log(2/δ))
)
.
The proof of this theorem follows by the decomposition of the regret of GP-MW into the sum of two
terms. The first term corresponds to the regret that player i incurs with respect to the sequence of
computed upper confidence bounds. The second term is due to not knowing the true reward function
ri. The proof of Theorem 1 then proceeds by bounding the first term using standard results from
adversarial online learning [7], while the second term is upper bounded by using regret bounding
techniques from GP optimization [23, 4].
Theorem 1 can be made more explicit by substituting bounds on γT . For instance, in the case of the
squared exponential kernel, the regret bound becomesRi(T ) = O
((
(logKi)
1/2 +(log T )d+1
)√
T
)
.
In comparison to the standard multi-armed bandit regret bound O(√TKi logKi) (e.g., [3]), this
regret bound does not depend on
√
Ki, similarly to the ideal full information setting.
The case of continuous action sets
In this section, we consider the case when Ai is a (continuous) compact subset of Rdi . In this case,
further assumptions are required on ri and Ai to achieve sublinear regret. Hence, we assume a
bounded set Ai ⊂ Rdi and ri to be Lipschitz continuous in ai. Under the same assumptions, existing
regret bounds areO(√diT log T ) andO(T
di+1
di+2 log T ) in the full information [18] and bandit setting
[22], respectively. By using a discretization argument, we obtain a high probability regret bound for
GP-MW.
Corollary 1. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and it be σi-sub-Gaussian with independence over time. Assume
‖ri‖k ≤ B, Ai ⊂ [0, b]di , and ri is L-Lipschitz in its first argument, and consider the discretization
[Ai]T with |[Ai]T | = (Lb
√
diT )
di such that ‖a− [a]T ‖1 ≤
√
di/T/L for every a ∈ Ai, where [a]T
is the closest point to a in [Ai]T . If player i plays actions from [Ai]T according to GP-MW with
βt = B +
√
2(γt−1 + log(2/δ)) and η =
√
8di log(Lb
√
diT )/T , then with probability at least
1− δ,
Ri(T ) = O
(√
diT log(Lb
√
diT ) +
√
T log(2/δ) +B
√
TγT +
√
TγT (γT + log(2/δ))
)
.
By substituting bounds on γT , our bound becomes Ri(T ) = O(T 1/2polylog(T)) in the case of the
SE kernel (for fixed d). Such a bound has a strictly better dependence on T than the existing bandit
bound O(T
di+1
di+2 log T ) from [22]. Similarly to [22, 18], the algorithm resulting from Corollary 1
is not efficient in high dimensional settings, as its computational complexity is exponential in di.
4 Experiments
In this section, we consider random matrix games and a traffic routing model and compare GP-MW
with the existing algorithms for playing repeated games. Then, we show an application of GP-MW
to robust BO and compare it with existing baselines on a movie recommendation problem.
4.1 Repeated random matrix games
We consider a repeated matrix game between two players with actionsA1 = A2 = {0, 1, . . . ,K−1}
and payoff matrices Ai ∈ RK×K , i = 1, 2. At every time step, each player i receives a payoff
ri(a1t , a
2
t ) = [A
i]a1t ,a2t , where [A
i]i,j indicates the (i, j)-th entry of matrix Ai. We select K = 30
and generate 10 random matrices with r1 = r2 ∼ GP (0, k(·, ·)), where k = kSE with l = 6. We set
the noise to it ∼ N (0, 1), and use T = 200. For every game, we distinguish between two settings:
Against random opponent. In this setting, player-2 plays actions uniformly at random from A2 at
every round t, while player-1 plays according to a no-regret algorithm. In Figure 1a, we compare the
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(a) Against random opponent (b) GP-MW vs. EXP3.P.
Figure 1: GP-MW leads to smaller regret compared to EXP3.P. HEDGE is an idealized benchmark
which upper bounds the achievable performance. Shaded areas represent ± one standard deviation.
time-averaged regret of player-1 when playing according to HEDGE [11], EXP3.P [3], and GP-MW.
Our algorithm is run with the true function prior while HEDGE receives (unrealistic) noiseless full
information feedback (at every round t) and leads to the lowest regret. When only the noisy bandit
feedback is available, GP-MW significantly outperforms EXP3.P.
GP-MW vs EXP3.P. Here, player-1 plays according to GP-MW while player-2 is an adaptive
adversary and plays using EXP3.P. In Figure 1b, we compare the regret of the two players averaged
over the game instances. GP-MW outperforms EXP3.P and ensures player-1 a smaller regret.
4.2 Repeated traffic routing
We consider the Sioux-Falls road network [14, 1], a standard benchmark model in the transportation
literature. The network is a directed graph with 24 nodes and 76 edges (e ∈ E). In this experiment,
we have N = 528 agents and every agent i seeks to send some number of units ui from a given
origin to a given destination node. To do so, agent i can choose among Ki = 5 possible routes
consisting of network edges E(i) ⊂ E. A route chosen by agent i corresponds to action ai ∈ R|E(i)|
with [ai]e = ui in case e belongs to the route and [ai]e = 0 otherwise. The goal of each agent i is to
minimize the travel time weighted by the number of units ui. The travel time of an agent is unknown
and depends on the total occupancy of the traversed edges within the chosen route. Hence, the travel
time increases when more agents use the same edges. The number of units ui for every agent, as
well as travel time functions for each edge, are taken from [14, 1]. A more detailed description of
our experimental setup is provided in Appendix C.
We consider a repeated game, where agents choose routes using either of the following algorithms:
• HEDGE. To run HEDGE, each agent has to observe the travel time incurred had she chosen any
different route. This requires knowing the exact travel time functions. Although these assumptions
are unrealistic, we use HEDGE as an idealized benchmark.
• EXP3.P. In the case of EXP3.P, agents only need to observe their incurred travel time. This
corresponds to the standard bandit feedback.
• GP-MW. Let ψ(a−it ) ∈ R|E(i)| be the total occupancy (by other agents) of edges E(i) at time t.
To run GP-MW, agent i needs to observe a noisy measurement of the travel time as well as the
corresponding ψ(a−it ).
• Q-BRI (Q-learning Better Replies with Inertia algorithm [8]). This algorithm requires the same
feedback as GP-MW and is proven to asymptotically converge to a Nash equilibrium (as the
considered game is a potential game [19]). We use the same set of algorithm parameters as in [8].
For every agent i to run GP-MW, we use a composite kernel ki such that for every a1,a2 ∈ A,
ki((ai1, a
−i
1 ), (a
i
2, a
−i
2 )) = k
i
1(a
i
1, a
i
2) · ki2(ai1 + ψ(a−i1 ), ai2 + ψ(a−i2 )) , where ki1 is a linear kernel
and ki2 is a polynomial kernel of degree n ∈ {2, 4, 6}.
First, we consider a random subset of 100 agents that we refer to as learning agents. These agents
choose actions (routes) according to the aforementioned no-regret algorithms for T = 100 game
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Figure 2: GP-MW leads to a significantly smaller average regret compared to EXP3.P and Q-BRI
and improves the overall congestion in the network. HEDGE represents an idealized full information
benchmark which upper bounds the achievable performance.
rounds. The remaining non-learning agents simply choose the shortest route, ignoring the presence
of the other agents. In Figure 2 (top plots), we compare the average regret (expressed in hours) of
the learning agents when they use the different no-regret algorithms. We also show the associated
average congestion in the network (see (13) in Appendix C for a formal definition). When playing
according to GP-MW, agents incur significantly smaller regret and the overall congestion is reduced
in comparison to EXP3.P and Q-BRI.
In our second experiment, we consider the same setup as before, but we vary the number of learning
agents. In Figure 2 (bottom plots), we show the final (when T = 100) average regret and congestion
as a function of the number of learning agents. We observe that GP-MW systematically leads to
a smaller regret and reduced congestion in comparison to EXP3.P and Q-BRI. Moreover, as the
number of learning agents increases, both HEDGE and GP-MW reduce the congestion in the network,
while this is not the case with EXP3.P or Q-BRI (due to a slower convergence).
4.3 GP-MW and robust Bayesian Optimization
In this section, we apply GP-MW to a novel robust Bayesian Optimization (BO) setting, similar to
the one considered in [4]. The goal is to optimize an unknown function f (under the same regularity
assumptions as in Section 2) from a sequence of queries and corresponding noisy observations. Very
often, the actual queried points may differ from the selected ones due to various input perturbations,
or the function may depend on external parameters that cannot be controlled (see [4] for examples).
This scenario can be modelled via a two player repeated game, where a player is competing against
an adversary. The unknown reward function is given by f : X ×∆ → R. At every round t of the
game, the player selects a point xt ∈ X , and the adversary chooses δt ∈ ∆. The player then observes
the parameter δt and a noisy estimate of the reward: f(xt, δt) + t. After T time steps, the player
incurs the regret
R(T ) = max
x∈X
T∑
t=1
f(x, δt)−
T∑
t=1
f(xt, δt).
Note that both the regret definition and feedback model are the same as in Section 2.
7
(a) Users chosen at random. (b) Users chosen by adaptive adversary.
Figure 3: GP-MW ensures no-regret against both randomly and adaptively chosen users, while
GP-UCB and STABLEOPT attain constant average regret.
In the standard (non-adversarial) Bayesian optimization setting, the GP-UCB algorithm [23] ensures
no-regret. On the other hand, the STABLEOPT algorithm [4] attains strong regret guarantees against
the worst-case adversary which perturbs the final reported point xT . Here instead, we consider
the case where the adversary is adaptive at every time t, i.e., it can adapt to past selected points
x1, . . . , xt−1. We note that both GP-UCB and STABLEOPT fail to achieve no-regret in this setting,
as both algorithms are deterministic conditioned on the history of play. On the other hand, GP-MW
is a no-regret algorithm in this setting according to Theorem 1 (and Corollary 1).
Next, we demonstrate these observations experimentally in a movie recommendation problem.
Movie recommendation. We seek to recommend movies to users according to their preferences.
A priori it is unknown which user will see the recommendation at any time t. We assume that such a
user is chosen arbitrarily (possibly adversarially), simultaneously to our recommendation.
We use the MovieLens-100K dataset [12] which provides a matrix of ratings for 1682 movies
rated by 943 users. We apply non-negative matrix factorization with p = 15 latent factors on the
incomplete rating matrix and obtain feature vectors mi,uj ∈ Rp for movies and users, respectively.
Hence, m>i uj represents the rating of movie i by user j. At every round t, the player selects mt ∈{m1, . . . ,m1682}, the adversary chooses (without observing mt) a user index it ∈ {1, . . . , 943},
and the player receives reward f(mt, it) = m>t uit . We model f via a GP with composite kernel
k((m, i), (m′, i′)) = k1(m,m′) · k2(i, i′) where k1 is a linear kernel and k2 is a diagonal kernel.
We compare the performance of GP-MW against the ones of GP-UCB and STABLEOPT
when sequentially recommending movies. In this experiment, we let GP-UCB select mt =
arg maxm maxi UCBt(m, i), while STABLEOPT chooses mt = arg maxm mini UCBt(m, i)
at every round t. Both algorithms update their posteriors with measurements at (mt, iˆt) with
iˆt = arg maxi UCBt(mt, i) in the case of GP-UCB and iˆt = arg mini LCBt(mt, i) for STA-
BLEOPT. Here, LCBt represents a lower confidence bound on f (see [4] for details).
In Figure 3a, we show the average regret of the algorithms when the adversary chooses users uniformly
at random at every t. In our second experiment (Figure 3b), we show their performance when the adver-
sary is adaptive and selects it according to the HEDGE algorithm. We observe that in both experiments
GP-MW is no-regret, while the average regrets of both GP-UCB and STABLEOPT do not vanish.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed GP-MW, a no-regret bandit algorithm for playing unknown repeated games. In
addition to the standard bandit feedback, the algorithm requires observing the actions of other players
after every round of the game. By exploiting the correlation among different game outcomes, it com-
putes upper confidence bounds on the rewards and uses them to simulate unavailable full information
feedback. Our algorithm attains high probability regret bounds that can substantially improve upon
the existing bandit regret bounds. In our experiments, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of
GP-MW on synthetic games, and real-world problems of traffic routing and movie recommendation.
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Supplementary Material
No-Regret Learning in Unknown Games with Correlated Payoffs
Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Ilija Bogunovic, Maryam Kamgarpour, Andreas Krause (NeurIPS 2019)
A Proof of Theorem 1
We make use of the following well-known confidence lemma.
Lemma 1 (Confidence Lemma). LetHk be a RKHS with underlying kernel function k. Consider an
unknown function f : A → R inHk such that ‖f‖k ≤ B, and the sampling model yt = f(at) + t
where t is σ-sub-Gaussian (with independence between times). By setting
βt = B +
√
2(γt−1 + log(1/δ))
the following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
|µt−1(a)− f(a)| ≤ βtσt−1(a) , ∀a ∈ A, ∀t ≥ 1 ,
where µt−1(·) and σt−1(·) are given in (2)-(3).
Lemma 1 follows directly from [2, Theorem 3.11 and Remark 3.13] as well as the definition of the
maximum information gain γt−1.
We can now prove Theorem 1. Recall the definition of regret
Ri(T ) = max
a∈Ai
T∑
t=1
ri(a, a−it )−
T∑
t=1
ri(ait, a
−i
t ) .
Defining a¯ = arg maxa∈Ai
∑T
t=1 r
i(a, a−it ), R
i(T ) can be rewritten as
Ri(T ) =
T∑
t=1
ri(a¯, a−it )−
T∑
t=1
ri(ait, a
−i
t ) .
By Lemma 1 and since rewards are in [0, 1], with probability 1− δ2 the true unknown reward function
can be upper and lower bounded as:
UCBt(a)− 2βtσt−1(a) ≤ ri(a) ≤ min{1, UCBt(a)}, ∀a ∈ A1 × · · · × AN , ∀t ≥ 1 , (7)
with UCBt defined in (4) and βt chosen according to Theorem 1. Thus, UCBt(a)− 2βtσt−1(a) is
a lower confidence bound of ri(a).
Hence,
Ri(T ) ≤
T∑
t=1
min{1, UCBt(a¯, a−it )} −
T∑
t=1
[
UCBt(a
i
t, a
−i
t )− 2βtσt−1(ait, a−it )
]
≤
T∑
t=1
min{1, UCBt(a¯, a−it )} −
T∑
t=1
min{1, UCBt(ait, a−it )}+ 2βT
T∑
t=1
σt−1(ait, a
−i
t ) ,
where the first inequality follows by (7) and the second one since βt is increasing in t.
Moreover, by [23, Lemma 5.4] and the choice βT = B +
√
2(γT + log(2/δ)), we have
2βT
T∑
t=1
σt−1(ait, a
−i
t ) = O
(
B
√
TγT +
√
TγT (γT + log(2/δ))
)
.
Next, we show that with probability 1− δ2 ,
T∑
t=1
min{1, UCBt(a¯, a−it )} −
T∑
t=1
min{1,UCBt(ait, a−it )}
= O
(√
T logKi +
√
T log(2/δ)
)
. (8)
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The statement of the theorem then follows by standard probability arguments:
P[E1 ∩ E1] = P[E1] + P[E2]− P[E1 ∪ E2] ≥
(
1− δ
2
)
+
(
1− δ
2
)
− 1 = 1− δ ,
where E1 and E2 are the events (7) and (8), respectively.
To show (8), define the function f it (·) = min{1, UCBt(·, a−it )}. Note that if (7) holds, UCBt(·) ≥ 0
since ri(·) ≥ 0, hence f it (·) ∈ [0, 1]Ki . Using such definition, the left hand side of (8) can be upper
bounded as:
T∑
t=1
f it (a¯)−
T∑
t=1
f it (a
i
t) ≤ max
a∈Ai
T∑
t=1
f it (a)−
T∑
t=1
f it (a
i
t) . (9)
Observe that the right hand side of (9) is precisely the regret which player i incurrs in an adver-
sarial online learning problem with reward functions f it (·) ∈ [0, 1]. The actions ait, moreover,
are exactly chosen by the HEDGE [11] algorithm which receives the full information feedback
rˆt = [f
i
t (a1), . . . , f
i
t (aKi)]. Note that the original version of HEDGE works with losses instead
of rewards, but the same happens in GP-MW since the mixed strategies are updated with 1 − rˆt.
Therefore, by [7, Corollary 4.2], with probability 1− δ2 ,
max
a∈Ai
T∑
t=1
f it (a)−
T∑
t=1
f it (a
i
t) = O
(√
T logKi +
√
T log(2/δ)
)
.
Note that according to [7, Remark 4.3], the functions f it (·) can be chosen by an adaptive adversary
depending on past actions ai1, . . . , a
i
t−1, but not on the current action a
i
t. This applies to our setting,
since f it depends only on a
i
1, . . . , a
i
t−1 and not on a
i
t.
B Proof of Corollary 1
A function f : X → R is Lipschitz continuous with constant L (or L-Lipschitz) if
|f(x)− f(x′)| ≤ L‖x− x′‖1 ∀x, x′ ∈ X .
DefineA−i = A1×· · ·×Ai−1×Ai×· · ·×AN . The fact that ri is L-Lispschitz in its first argument
implies that
|ri(a, a−i)− ri(a′, a−i)| ≤ L‖a− a′‖1 ∀a, a′ ∈ Ai,∀a−i ∈ A−i . (10)
Moreover, recall the discrete set [Ai]T with |[Ai]T | = (Lb
√
diT )
di such that ‖a − [a]T ‖1 ≤
bdi/Lb
√
diT =
√
di/T/L ∀a ∈ Ai, where [a]T is the closest point to a in [Ai]T . An example of
such a set can be obtained for instance by a uniform grid of points in [0, b]di .
As in the proof of Theorem 1, let a¯ = arg maxa∈Ai
∑T
t=1 r
i(a, a−it ). Moreover, let [a¯]T be the
closest point to a¯ in [Ai]T . We have:
Ri(T ) =
T∑
t=1
ri(a¯, a−it )−
T∑
t=1
ri(ait, a
−i
t )
=
T∑
t=1
ri(a¯, a−it )−
T∑
t=1
ri([a¯]T , a
−i
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ri1(T )
+
T∑
t=1
ri([a¯]T , a
−i
t )−
T∑
t=1
ri(ait, a
−i
t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ri2(T )
.
We prove the corollary by bounding Ri1(T ) and R
i
2(T ) separately.
By the Lipschitz property (10) of ri, and by construction of [Ai]T , we have that
|ri(a¯, a−i)− ri([a¯]T , a−i)| ≤ L‖a¯− [a¯]T ‖1 ≤ L
√
di/T
L
=
√
di/T , ∀a−i ∈ A−i . (11)
Hence, by (11),
Ri1(T ) ≤ T
√
di/T =
√
diT .
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To bound Ri2(T ), note that R
i
2(T ) ≤ arg maxa∈[Ai]T
∑T
t=1 r
i(a, a−it ) −
∑T
t=1 r
i(ait, a
−i
t ). More-
over, note that actions ait are chosen by running GP-MW on the discretized domain [Ai]T with
Ki = |[Ai]T | = (Lb
√
diT )
di . Hence, according to Theorem 1 it must hold that with probability at
least 1− δ,
Ri2(T ) = O
(√
T logKi +
√
T log(2/δ) +B
√
TγT +
√
TγT (γT + log(2/δ))
)
.
The final bound then follows by substituting Ki = (Lb
√
diT )
di in the bound above and noting that
Ri1(T ) is dominated by R
i
2(T ).
C Repeated traffic routing - Experimental setup
In this section we give a detailed explanation of our traffic routing experiment of Section 4.2.
We consider the Sioux-Falls road network [14, 1], a directed graph with 24 nodes and 76 edges e ∈ E.
We use the demand data from [14, 1]. Such data indicate the units of flow to be sent from each node
(origin) to any other node (destination) in the network. Each of those origin-destination pair is here
represented by an agent, for a total of N = 528 agents. The goal of each agent i is to send ui units of
demand to destination, while minimizing the total travel time. The time to reach destination, however,
depends on the total occupancy of the edges the agent chooses to traverse and hence on the routes
chosen by all the other agents.
Each edge e has a travel time te(x) which is a function of the total number of units x traversing e .
Intuitively, we expect such travel time to increase with x. According to [14, 1], we select te to be the
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) function
te(x) = ce
(
1 + 0.15
( x
Ce
)4)
,
where ce and Ce are free-flow time and capacity of edge e, respectively. Values for ce and Ce are
taken from [1].
Each agent i can choose among Ki = 5 routes, and we assume that she cannot split her demand over
different routes. Hence, the action space Ai represents the 5 shortest routes that agent i can take.
Moreover, we remove from Ai any route more than three times longer than the shortest one. Let
E(i) ⊂ E be the subset of edges that agent i could possibly traverse. Each route in Ai corresponds
to a vector ai ∈ R|E(i)| ∈ Ai such that [ai]e = ui if edge e belongs to the given route, and [ai]e = 0
otherwise. Moreover, we let ψ(a−i) =∈ R|E(i)| be the total occupancy by the other agents on such
edges, i.e., [ψ(a−i)]e =
∑
j 6=i[a
j ]e for every e ∈ E(i). The travel time of agent i can thus be written
as
li(ai, a−i) =
∑
e∈E(i)
[ai]e te([a
i]e + [ψ(a
−i)]e) , (12)
i.e., the sum of the travel times on the selected edges, weighted by ui. Hence, we let the reward
function of agent i be ri(ai, a−i) = −li(ai, a−i).
Note that agents don’t know the actual te’s functions, hence their reward function is unknown. This
does not limit the bandit EXP3.P algorithm, where agents only need to observe their experienced travel
times. However, it makes the full information feedback HEDGE algorithm unrealistic. Nevertheless,
we used HEDGE in our experiments as an idealized benchmark.
To run GP-MW, agent i observes the experienced travel time as well as the vector of occupancies
ψ(a−i). This allows GP-MW to exploit the correlations in the unknown reward function by choosing
a suitable kernel. For every agent i, we chose a composite kernel ki such that for every a1,a2 ∈ A,
ki((ai1, a
−i
1 ), (a
i
2, a
−i
2 )) = k
i
1(a
i
1, a
i
2) · ki2(ai1 + ψ(a−i1 ), ai2 + ψ(a−i2 )), with ki1 and ki2 being linear
and polynomial kernels, respectively. This reflects the different dependences that ri has on ai and
a−i. In fact, for fixed total occupancy in each edge, we expect ri to be linear in ai, being the
travel time an additive quantity (see (12)). On the other hand, given a specific route chosen, ri
grows polynomially with the total occupancy on such route (see (12)). Kernels hyperparameters are
optimized via maximum-likelihood over 200 random outcomes.
To scale their rewards in [0,1] agents need to know upper bounds on their travel times. Such bounds
are estimated by 10′000 random outcomes and fed to the agents. Moreover, standard deviations of
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measurement noises are chosen 0.1 % of such upper bounds. Finally, to evaluate a given outcome at
of the game, we compute the congestion on a given edge e via the expression:
0.15 · ( N∑
j=1
[ajt ]e/Ce
)4
. (13)
The average congestion in the network is obtained by averaging the quantity above over all the edges
e ∈ E.
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